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Approaches to Historical Explanations 
Esther Eidinow 
 
Ann Taves’ Revelatory Events is a fascinating book. It draws its reader into the 
earliest days of three different spiritual organizations (their identification as such is 
carefully drawn), methodically unpacking the processes of their emergence. Very 
clearly written and structured, it moves between disciplinary discourses, sifting 
meaning from the multiple narratives relating to each case study, and their myriad, 
often conflicting details. In particular, Taves’ examination of these accretions of 
accounts, and her insights into the ways in which these stories shifted over time and 
changing contexts, are particularly absorbing. The result is a rich and very stimulating 
volume. Taves states in the preface (p. xiii) that there are three different ways of 
reading the book: first, as a contribution to the study of new social movements; 
second, as a contribution to creativity studies; and third, as a demonstration of how 
historians can use cognitive social sciences to explain historical phenomena. 
(“Cognitive social sciences” is unpacked later to mean a combination of social 
scientific theories about creativity with experimental research on nonconscious mental 
processes grounded in evolutionary and cognitive social psychology; see p. 224.) The 
book aims to explain the nature of revelation specifically as an event, and this reader 
certainly came away with clearer insights into both the experimental research into 
individual abilities which may explain such phenomena, and aspects of the historical 
contexts in which they may have occurred. And, from its earliest pages, this account 
provoked useful and invigorating questions for me, and I am grateful for the 
opportunity to explore them a little further here. 
 I start with a brief response to the book’s initial discussion of the definition of 
revelation and its knowledge claims. This aspect introduces not only a number of 
specific issues that I will discuss further below, including the analysis of the 
subjective experience of historical actors, and the nature of historical explanation, but 
also an overriding theme of concern that runs throughout my comments here: the need 
for – and difficulties of introducing – contextual complexity. 
 Taves states early on (p. 2) that there are two knowledge claims involved in a 
“revelatory event.” The first of these is “the commonplace and empirically verifiable 
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claim that knowledge has been communicated or disclosed,” and it is the second, the 
claim that it comes “from a divine, supernatural, or suprahuman source,” which is 
“controversial.” At first sight, this neat division seems intuitively right, but (for me) 
reflection on examples of ancient revelatory events prompts some uncertainty. For 
example, the accounts of healings (iamata) given in dreams at Epidauros, in the 
Sanctuary of Asclepius, are difficult to fit into this structure (for translations of the 
texts, see LiDonnici, 1995). How are we to understand the claim that such knowledge 
had been communicated as either commonplace or empirically verifiable, except in 
the most trivial sense? For the Greeks, the idea that a god might visit in a dream, and 
impart the means of your physical or mental restitution, was perhaps less unusual than 
in (at least) most modern Western cultures; but the fact that accounts of such visits 
were posted on stelai (pillars) around the temple implies that this was not regarded as 
a “commonplace” claim. The display of the iamata, as well as the fact that these 
accounts include stories about those who visited and doubted the god’s power, also 
intimates that, even for those involved, verifiability was an issue. In turn, the division 
between the claim that knowledge had been communicated (knowledge that often 
involved guidance about what behavior was acceptable to the gods) and the origin of 
that knowledge is unclear: the (often remarkable) content of these revelations can be 
read as offering at least some evidence that the interaction in which it was transmitted 
must have been with a supernatural figure. Thus, the clarity of Taves’ initial definition, 
while admirable, seems to me to risk eliding the necessary complexity of this 
phenomenon. Indeed, when we turn back to the case studies in this book, her own 
careful examination of the content of the different revelatory claims indicates that her 
analytical approach is more complex than this initial definition suggests. These case 
studies seem to demonstrate that the claims made about the communication of the 
knowledge are as significant as – and integrally related to – those about its source. 
 Examining the definition of revelation leads directly to another example where 
complexity is necessary: the subjective experience of historical actors. As part of the 
discussion of her own values and presuppositions (pp. 9–10), Taves argues that “it’s 
important to take account of how things feel to people on the inside,” and asserts that 
it is important to be able to shift between humanistic and scientific assumptions, so 
that we can “explore what experiences, beliefs and practices are like for those who 
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hold them.” This is something of an impossible ambition for most ancient historical 
studies. For example, the individuals whose experiences are recorded in the Iamata 
are otherwise unknown; they left nothing behind but a name and an inscription; they 
may never have existed; and yet they appear to offer attestation of a certain body of 
beliefs. (And I use the term “belief” loosely, in light of the current debate in my field 
about its historical significance.) Nevertheless, while there are many who would 
disagree that we can ever access the realm of experience or belief of our historical 
subjects, I would rather argue that an individual cannot be extracted from their 
surrounding culture – with all that implies both for an individual’s cognitive processes 
and the evidence produced by or about them. In the process of being spoken or 
written, even a first-person narrative is, of course, a product of some reflective 
practice on the part of the author, shaped by existing cultural frames, and in response 
to assumed audiences and implicit or explicit expectations.  
 This may provide ancient historians with something to say about experience; it 
has different implications I think for Taves’ project. The evidence that she brings to 
bear largely comprises written testimony; her description of her method is relatively 
brief. Specifically (p. 304), in explaining how to access a subject’s initial appraisals, 
she describes a process of comparing texts and looking for a comparison of subevents: 
if the descriptions of what happened change over time, then this should prompt 
analysis in relation to the context in which that narrative was told; if they remain 
stable, they are more likely to be “ closely connected to the initial unconscious 
appraisal of the event.”  This is a thoughtful approach, necessitating gratifyingly close 
attention to the details of the texts, and usefully reminding us of the ways in which 
contexts shape narratives. Nevertheless, it raises questions, seeming, perhaps 
inadvertently, to suggest that an initial unconscious appraisal can occur in the absence 
of social learning. Those factors that remain stable across testimonies surely require 
as much explication as those that change between versions: to begin to develop an 
understanding of events, we need to set the historical actors in context; to begin to 
grasp their motivations, we need to begin to assemble their worldview, situated within 
their social relations, and constrained by institutions and social structures. 
 The phenomena of revelation (or any historical event) take place within a 
nexus of (causal) social factors; this is not to leave behind individual mental processes, 
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but rather to consider how they interact with, shape, and are shaped by social context. 
To illustrate what I mean, first, take the question of the negotiation of Joseph Smith’ s 
authority. Taves provides a wonderfully detailed analysis of the various relevant 
narratives, and the ways in which these may indicate the changing appraisals of 
individual and group. A key element in the formation of those narratives, however, 
was the broader cultural context in which they were produced, which will have 
influenced both the interactions around this practice (e.g., Smith’ s being taken to 
court in 1826) and the actors’  motivations (e.g., Smith’ s careful protection of his 
own authority vs. those who also claimed to have gifts of seership and prophecy). 
In order to better evaluate Smith’ s mentality, motivation, and activities –  and those 
of the people who responded to him –  we require some understanding of the world of 
seers that he inhabited, and the nature and extent of the associated beliefs in the 
region. Taves does give some glimpses of the larger society, which whet the appetite, 
but I would have welcomed a fuller examination of the complexity of both beliefs and 
social relations in which Smith was operating (e.g., Sally Chase, mentioned on p. 41 
as another local seer, enlisted by a “ mob”  to find the gold plates, was also a very 
successful treasure seeker, and sister to Willard Chase, on whose ground Smith’ s 
stone was found, and who fought for ownership and return of the stone; see Bushman, 
1984 , p. 70). 
 Broader contextual material of this kind enriches our understanding of the 
actors and their motivations; it may also further problematize a historical analysis. For 
example, it is not surprising that the most detailed psychological insights into the key 
individuals in these case studies occur with reference to the most recent, Helen 
Schucman. They include reports of her “ neurotic side… anger, skepticism, and 
inability to change”  (p. 173), and her unrequited and obsessive feelings for William 
Thetford. I was particularly taken by the inclusion of this detail, especially in 
comparison to the other key figures about whom such evaluative and emotional 
personal information was not given. In Part 2 of the book (p. 284), Taves considers 
how Schucman’ s desire for Thetford may have shaped the final goals of the Voice, 
and includes an analysis of her need for love. The overall impression is of Schucman 
as powerless in the face of her feelings, the object of those feelings, and even of the 
Voice itself. I wondered how this impression might be changed if these factors had 
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been introduced in Part 1’ s descriptive analysis of the processes that generated 
Schucman’ s early visions, for example if we asked to what extent Schucman’ s desire 
to engage Thetford and keep him interested influenced her accounts to him of her 
earliest visualizations; or whether/how the emergence of the Voice provided 
Schucman with a source of authority that challenged the power of her obsession with 
Thetford. Could this information have been deployed to explore Schucman’s 
motivations and her agency? Paradoxically, the very factor that appears to deepen our 
understanding of her motivation may also, in some ways, be taken to undermine her 
authority. Although in the end this is noted as being irrelevant, it is only in the case of 
Schucman that Taves suggests that insight into her personal motives could have raised 
the possibility that they were “questionable” (p. 284); in contrast, the idea that, for 
example, Joseph Smith may have been looking for economic gain is not discussed in 
the same way. Perhaps particularly, but not only, with regard to Helen Schucman, the 
question of the role of the cultural framings of gender and its interplay with 
attributions of authority seems very relevant to these case studies, and some 
discussion of this aspect would have added an additional dimension to this rich 
analysis. (Most surprising, perhaps, is its absence in the comparison of Smith and 
Schucman and their respective experiences and processes of translating their 
materials; pp. 241– 269.) 
 While we may distil an explanation that provides some key elements of the 
phenomenon we wish to explore, in situ, the manifestations of that phenomenon 
and/or relations between concepts areinevitably more nuanced, revealing a 
complexity that it is necessary to investigate if we are to acquire deeper understanding. 
To gather a full picture of the emergence and social formation of organizations such 
as those under study here requires us to understand or situate the leading individual in 
both their personal and their historical context. Information of this kind is not simply 
descriptive analysis, it is a mode of explanation. It furthers our comprehension of the 
individuals being studied. For example, in Part 2, the question of the remarkable 
nature of these individuals is raised, but just how remarkable and in what ways can 
really only be established by a fuller examination of the context in which they 
developed. This would also help to unravel the group processes of co-creation that 
were involved in the emergence of a supernatural presence. It may be more useful in 
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analyzing the spread of “ belief”  than invoking, as here, Durkheim’ s theory of the 
totem (pp. 292– 295), to explain the ways in which the surrounding group relates to 
either the particular instantiation of the supernatural in each case or to the figure 
channeling it. Durkheim’ s theory was and remains controversial: used here, it 
subsumes the complicated, individual relationships to which the evidence itself attests. 
(I did ask myself if the identification of the supernatural figure as the totem was what 
was misleading here.) Similarly, the dichotomy of believer and skeptic (in-group and 
out-group) that occurs in some of these case studies could also be usefully nuanced. 
For example, in the first case study, it seems too neat to argue that the witnesses 
simply saw as Joseph Smith did, and are therefore evidence for “ the power of the 
human mind to see things together in faith”  (p. 65). The comparison made a few 
pages earlier in the book, between Smith’ s approach to the gold tablets and a 
Catholic’ s approach to transubstantiation, is rather to the point: even within that 
dogmatic institution, there is evidence of the variability of beliefs in those going to 
Mass (Hornsby-Smith, 1991 ). It may be that Joseph Smith regarded his work in this 
way, but with regard to the beliefs of his followers, like those who go to Mass, it 
seems misleading to assert that they “ saw things together.” 
 These reflections lead to some more general observations about the nature of 
explanation, particularly prompted by Taves’ comments on the relationship of history 
to other disciplines, which she addresses on p. 3 of the introduction and which also 
structures the volume as a whole. The first part of the book, as she notes, is written as 
a “ historian.”  This appears to mean “ analyzing the events people consider revelatory 
without attempting to explain them” ; the second part of the book, as Taves describes 
it, draws on a broader range of disciplines to create an explanation of the emergence 
of these new spiritual paths in naturalistic terms. I am intrigued by the way this 
division is characterized, since it appears to imply that history is a methodologically 
unitary discipline that does not bring us into the “ explanatory fray”  in a way that is 
achieved by the sciences. The idea that historians do not set out to explain phenomena 
is puzzling (the fifth-century BCE writer Thucydides provides perhaps one of the 
earliest examples of a writer of history who explicitly invokes this as his motivation). 
There are, of course, different philosophies of historical explanation (and it might be 
possible to reframe the book’ s two parts in these terms, Part 2 illustrative of an 
This is an Author’s Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, 
Brain and Behaviour on 21/3/2018, available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2018.1429010. 
 
 
Anglo-American analytic tradition –  the focus on mental processes offers an 
intriguing twist to questions of causality –  while the analysis of narrative in the book’ 
s Part 1 engages more with a continental hermeneutic tradition). Moreover, historians 
have drawn on a broad range of other disciplines, albeit not without scholarly debate 
(e.g., Scott, 2012 ). It does not seem to be necessary to turn (as Taves) to a naturalistic 
explanation in order to acquire an “ economical explanation that presupposes that 
what things feel like subjectively isn’ t necessarily the best way to explain them 
scientifically.” 
 But, more importantly, this seems to beg the question of what comprises a 
scientific explanation, and what is meant by (or is so desirable about) being 
“ economical.”  As I have tried to suggest in this brief commentary, while more 
rigorous models for establishing the mental processes of individuals and the appraisal 
processes of small groups can provide a fascinating perspective on historical events 
and the experiences of historical actors, without the social context they can offer only 
a partial explanation of these phenomena. 
Taves has delineated some of the ways in which different explanatory approaches can 
run alongside 
one another. Her approach is pioneering: attempts to introduce theories from the hard 
sciences into humanities have met with substantial challenges. Here we find the 
mental processes of the individual clearly and helpfully explained, and a model for 
how their study can provide further historical insights. 
But the question of how to integrate these insights, exploring how individual relates to 
group, and then to wider society (as a social movement spreads), remains for me less 
clear. As Hedström and Swedberg 
(1998, p. 13) put it, in their discussion of social science mechanisms (conceptually 
similar to that of 
Taves, but emphasizing the inter-relationality of individuals): “The action being 
analyzed is always action by individuals that is oriented to the behavior of others.” 
They propose using a number ofmechanisms at different levels of social focus and 
process: first, situational, then action-formation mechanisms and then a 
transformationalmechanism. I wonder how this could come together with the 
mechanism described by Taves, and what level of analytical complexity that 
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combination could achieve. Whether this particular method was employed or not, 
such a study that combined the naturalistic study of individuals with a fuller analysis 
of social context would be very demanding, and no doubt require that the writer focus 
on just one case study. I have to say, I really hope that Ann Taves will write this for 
us. 
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